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# **Automated Vehicles: Risks and Regulatory Challenges**

**Steven E. Shladover, Sc.D.**

**University of California PATH Program**

**ITS Australia Summit, Brisbane**

**September 28, 2017**



# Outline

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- **Automated Driving Systems (ADS) defined in SAE J3016**
- **How safe is safe enough?**
- **Regulatory principles**
- **Federal approach in U.S.**
- **California approach**
- **Risks – why this is so difficult**

# SAE J3016: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles

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- available free at: [http://standards.sae.org/j3016\\_201609/](http://standards.sae.org/j3016_201609/)
- Automated Driving Systems (ADS) can perform the complete “dynamic driving task” without needing continuous human supervision:
  - Level 3: “fallback-ready user” must be ready to intervene quickly when requested, in situations the ADS can’t handle
  - Level 4: automation limited to use within a defined Operational Design Domain (ODD)
  - Level 5: automation usable under all conditions in which humans can drive

# Operational Design Domain (ODD)

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The specific conditions under which a given driving automation system is designed to function, including:

- Roadway type
- Traffic conditions and speed range
- Geographic location (boundaries)
- Weather and lighting conditions
- Availability of necessary supporting infrastructure features
- Condition of pavement markings and signage
- (and potentially more...)

# Safety Goal: How Safe?

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- Perfection is unattainable
- Human drivers are already remarkably safe based on U.S. statistics:
  - 3.4 M vehicle hours between fatal crashes (390 years of non-stop 24/7 driving)
  - 61,400 vehicle hours between injury crashes (7 years of non-stop 24/7 driving)
- Australian statistics somewhat better than this
- How much safer do ADS need to be for acceptance by society? 2X? 5X? 10X?
- How could a developer prove that their system has reached the target safety level?

# Regulatory Challenges

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- **Automation software breaks the traditional boundary between vehicle equipment and driving behavior**
  - **Traditional federal and state divisions of responsibilities**
- **Need to balance protecting public safety and encouraging innovation in vehicle technology**
- **Absence of technical standards or test procedures → too difficult to define these**
- **Safety-critical events are rare, strange and not susceptible to codification**

# Fundamental Considerations in Defining Automation Regulations

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- **Balancing need to protect public safety (due diligence) with desire to encourage technological innovation**
- **Trying to ensure that general public really understands limitations of their vehicles**
- **Detecting unsafe systems as early as possible**
- **Managing cultural differences between automotive and information technology industries**
- **Self-certification vs. third-party certification**
- **Determining where to draw the go/no-go line**

# NHTSA 2016 Policy Guidance

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- Released for public comment and review Sept. 20, 2016
    - 112-page report with 123 footnotes
  - Broad statement of balanced approach in four areas:
    - Vehicle performance guidance
    - Model state policy
    - NHTSA’s current regulatory tools
    - Modern (future) regulatory tools
  - Applies to “highly automated vehicles”, HAV (SAE Levels 3-5)
  - Extensive outreach process
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# NHTSA 2017 Update

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## Automated Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety

- Released Sept. 12, 2017
- 36 pages, 35 footnotes
- Voluntary guidance only
- Tells states to back off
- No enforcement mechanisms
- “Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment”
- “Technical Assistance to States” – legislative and administrative recommendations
- Appears to assume all industry participants are totally competent and conscientious



# **NHTSA “Safety Self-Assessment” Elements Retained from 2016 to 2017**

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- **Data recording**
- **System safety**
- **Vehicle cybersecurity**
- **Human-machine interface**
- **Crashworthiness**
- **Consumer education and training**
- **Federal, state and local law**
- **Post-crash behavior**
- **Operational design domain**
- **Object and event detection and response**
- **Fallback (minimal risk condition)**
- **Validation methods**

# NHTSA Changes from 2016 to 2017

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## Deleted elements:

- Data sharing
- Privacy
- Registration and certification
- Ethical considerations

## Added:

**“NHTSA strongly encourages states not to codify this Voluntary Guidance (that is, incorporate it into State statutes) as a legal requirement for any phases of development, testing, or deployment of ADSs”**

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# NHTSA 2017 “Technical Assistance to States”

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- **Legislative:**
  - Technology neutrality
  - Licensing and registration
  - Reporting for public safety officials
  - Review regulations that could be barriers
- **Administrative**
  - Choose a lead agency per state
  - Create an ADS technology committee
  - Address unnecessary barriers to deployment
  - Application for testing
  - Issuing testing permits
  - Assign liability

# What now at the U.S. national level?

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- **No FMVSS likely in this administration**
  - **No federal restrictions to limit bad behaviors by irresponsible or incompetent developers until after people have been killed or injured**
  - **Need a non-government mechanism to pressure industry to behave responsibly**
    - **Leadership from well-respected independent institutions (National Academies, etc.)**
    - **Independent experts' review and vetting of "safety self-assessments" while protecting IP**
    - **Shaming the bad actors**
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# California Background

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- **SB 1298 amended Vehicle Code in July 2012**
- **Rules apply to SAE Level 3+ driving automation**
- **Testing regulations effective Sept. 2014**
  - **Permission for specific vehicles, drivers**
  - **Strict test driver requirements**
  - **Describe prior closed-course testing**
  - **No heavy vehicle, motorcycle testing now**
  - **Report certain driver interventions, but all crashes**
- **Permits for 42 manufacturers, 269 vehicles, 975 test drivers**
  - **(July 2016: 14 mfgs., 111 vehicles, 428 drivers)**

# Extensions to CA Testing Regulations

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- **CA DMV released draft for formal review and public comment on March 10, 2017 (*prior to NHTSA update*):**
  - **Clarified identification of covered vehicles (SAE L3-5) and importance of Operational Design Domain (ODD)**
  - **Extended validity of permit to 2 years**
  - **No paying passengers during testing**
  - **More specific requirements on disengagement reports**
  - **New set of regulations for testing without driver onboard**

# Testing without an onboard driver

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**For vehicles designed for “driverless” operation:**

- **Manufacturer assumes liability for collisions**
- **Notify all local authorities within ODD**
- **Wireless communication with properly licensed remote operator to monitor status**
- **FMVSS compliance or NHTSA exemption**
- **Law enforcement interaction plan, with multiple specific requirements**
- **Submit copy of NHTSA Safety Assessment Letter**
- **Disclose any personally identifiable data collection to passengers**



# California Deployment Regulation Principles and Background

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- **Public safety now depends on the technology, not on the trained test drivers**
- **Treat all developers equally**
- **Clear and unambiguous requirements representing real transportation needs to avoid temptations to “game the test”**
- **Transparency of results to gain public confidence, without jeopardizing developers’ intellectual property**
- ***March 10, 2017 draft for public comment, prior to NHTSA update***

# CA Deployment Permit Proposal (1/2)

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- **Define ODD and certify that “autonomous mode” cannot operate outside ODD**
- **EDR to record sensor data for 30 s before and 5 s after any crash**
- **Comply with FMVSS or have NHTSA exemption**
- **Comply with CA Vehicle Code, including updates at least annually**
- **Self-diagnostics against cyber-attacks**
- **Consumer education plan – ODD restrictions, with submittal of language used, and access for law enforcement, EMR and used-vehicle purchasers**
- **How it will come to a complete stop after a failure**

# CA Deployment Permit Proposal (2/2)

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- **Show test data proving performance within ODD:**
  - **VMT within each ODD inside and outside CA**
  - **How system was validated**
  - **Safety-critical incidents encountered in testing**
  - **Description of collisions and how they will be avoided in the future**
- **Submit copy of NHTSA “Safety Assessment Letter”**
- **If no driver is required, add:**
  - **Communication with remote operator**
  - **Display owner/operator info. for law enforcement**
  - **FMVSS compliance or NHTSA exemption**

# Additional CA Draft Provisions

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- File amendment “prior to implementing a material change in the capabilities or performance...”
- Report safety-related defects
- Suspend permit based on failures to disclose, misrepresentations, recalls, safety concerns
  - **Manufacturer must notify vehicle owners**
- Disclose to owner any collection of information not necessary for safe operation
  - **Owner opt-in to collection of identifiable data**
- Manufacturer liable for crashes in “autonomous mode”, but driver responsible otherwise
- Truth in advertising about “autonomous” capabilities

# Traffic Safety Challenges for High and Full Automation (SAE Levels 4, 5)

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- Extreme external conditions arising without advance warning (failure of another vehicle, dropped load, lightning,...)
- NEW CRASHES caused by automation:
  - Strange circumstances the system designer could not anticipate
  - Software bugs not exercised in testing
  - Undiagnosed faults in the vehicle
  - Catastrophic failures of vital vehicle systems (loss of electrical power...)
- Driver not available to act as the fall-back

# Why this is a super-hard problem

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- **Software intensive system (no technology available to verify or validate its safety under its full range of operating conditions)**
- **Electro-mechanical elements don't benefit from Moore's Law cost reductions**
- **Cannot afford to rely on extensive hardware redundancy for protection from failures**
- **Harsh and unpredictable hazard environment**
- **Non-professional vehicle owners and operators cannot ensure proper maintenance and training**

# Dynamic External Hazards (Examples)

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- **Behaviors of other vehicles:**
  - **Entering from blind driveways**
  - **Violating traffic laws**
  - **Moving erratically following crashes with other vehicles**
  - **Law enforcement (sirens and flashing lights)**
- **Pedestrians (especially small children) and bicyclists**
- **Officers directing traffic**
- **Animals (domestic pets to large wildlife)**
- **Opening doors of parked cars**
- **Unsecured loads falling off trucks**
- **Debris from previous crashes**
- **Landslide debris (sand, gravel, rocks)**
- **Any object that can disrupt vehicle motion**

# Environmental Conditions (Examples)

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- **Electromagnetic pulse disturbance (lightning)**
- **Precipitation (rain, snow, mist, sleet, hail, fog,...)**
- **Other atmospheric obscurants (dust, smoke,...)**
- **Night conditions without illumination**
- **Low sun angle glare**
- **Glare off snowy and icy surfaces**
- **Reduced road surface friction (rain, snow, ice, oil...)**
- **High and gusty winds**
- **Road surface markings and signs obscured by snow/ice**
- **Road surface markings obscured by reflections off wet surfaces**
- **Signs obscured by foliage or displaced by vehicle crashes**



# Internal Faults – Functional Safety Challenges

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## Solvable with a lot of hard work:

- Mechanical and electrical component failures
- Computer hardware and operating system glitches
- Sensor condition or calibration faults

## Requiring more fundamental breakthroughs:

- System design errors
- System specification errors
- Software coding bugs

# Safety Challenges for Full Automation

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- Must be “significantly” safer than today’s driving baseline (2X? 5X? 10X?)
  - Fatal crash MTBF > 3.4 million vehicle hours
  - Injury crash MTBF > 61,400 vehicle hours
- Cannot prove safety of software for safety-critical applications
- Complexity – cannot test all possible combinations of input conditions and their timing
- How many hours of testing would be needed to demonstrate safety better than today?
- How many hours of continuous, unassisted automated driving have been achieved in real traffic under diverse conditions?

# Evidence from Recent Public Testing

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- **California DMV testing rules require annual reports on safety-related disengagements**
- **Waymo (Google) far ahead of others:**
  - **All disengagements reconstructed in detailed simulations (what if allowed to continue?)**
  - **Simulations showed ~8000 km between critical events in 2016 (2.5 factor improvement over 2015)**
- **Human drivers in U.S. traffic safety statistics:**
  - **~ 3 million km per injury crash**
  - **150 million km per fatal crash**

# Needed Breakthroughs

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- **Software safety design, verification and validation methods to overcome limitations of:**
    - **Formal methods**
    - **Brute-force testing**
    - **Non-deterministic learning systems**
  - **Robust threat assessment sensing and signal processing to reach zero false negatives and near-zero false positives**
  - **Robust control system fault detection, identification and accommodation, within 0.1 s response**
  - **Ethical decision making for robotics**
  - **Cyber-security protection**
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# Threat Assessment Challenge

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- **Detect and respond to every hazard, including those that are hard to see:**
  - **Negative obstacles (deep potholes)**
  - **Inconspicuous threats (brick in tire track)**
- **Ignore conspicuous but innocuous targets**
  - **Metallized balloon**
  - **Paper bag**
- **Serious challenges to sensor technologies**
- **How to set detection threshold sensitivity to reach zero false negatives (missed hazards) and near-zero false positives?**

# Much Harder than Commercial Aircraft Autopilot Automation

Measure of Difficulty – Orders of Magnitude	Factor
Number of targets each vehicle needs to track ( $\sim 10$ )	1
Number of vehicles the region needs to monitor ( $\sim 10^6$ )	4
Accuracy of range measurements needed to each target ( $\sim 10$ cm)	3
Accuracy of speed difference measurements needed to each target ( $\sim 1$ m/s)	1
Time available to respond to an emergency while cruising ( $\sim 0.1$ s)	2
Acceptable cost to equip each vehicle ( $\sim \$3000$ )	3
Annual production volume of automation systems ( $\sim 10^6$ )	- 4
<b>Sum total of orders of magnitude</b>	<b>10</b>

# What to do now?

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- **Focus on connected vehicle capabilities (I2V, V2I, V2V) to provide technology for cooperation**
- **For earliest public benefits from automation, focus on transit and trucking applications in protected rights of way**
  - **Professional drivers and maintenance**
  - **Direct economic benefits**
- **Capitalize on managed lanes to concentrate equipped vehicles together**
- **Develop enabling technologies for Level 5 automation (software verification and safety, real-time fault identification and management, hazard detection sensing,...)**